Remixed!

Should all acquaintance be forgot and never brought to mind,
should all acquaintance be forgot for the sake of auld lang syne.

For auld lang syne, my dear, for auld lang syne,
we'll take a cup of kindness yet for the sake of auld lang syne.

For auld lang syne, my dear, for auld lang syne,
we'll take a cup of kindness yet for the sake of auld lang syne.

Let's have a drink or maybe two or maybe three or four
or five or six or seven or eight or maybe even more.

For auld lang syne, my dear, for auld lang syne,
we'll take a cup of kindness yet for the sake of auld lang syne.

When it gets to closing time and if you still want more,
I know a pub in Inverness that never shuts its door.

For auld lang syne, my dear, for auld lang syne,
we'll take a cup of kindness yet for the sake of auld lang syne.

 

As the records of man are imperfect,
And the memory of man unstable:
The names of many of these messengers
Are known in one place and not in another,
Or among one people and not among others;
And some of their names have perished utterly;
But their message stands one and indivisible,
Even though it may have been forgotten,
Or twisted by ignorance, error, superstition or perversity;
Or misunderstood in the blinding light
Of time or tortuous Circumstances

Abdullah Yusuf Ali, 1938

It really sums up the individual's interpretation of "religion" today.

The Last Exit from Iraq

All of this has happened before and all of this will happen again…

Joel Rayburn. Foreign Affairs. New York: Mar/Apr 2006. Vol. 85, Iss. 2; pg. 29

Abstract (Summary)

The United States was not the first country in the last hundred years to occupy Iraq. That distinction belongs to the United Kingdom, which seized the provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and formally took control of the new country in 1920, under a mandate from the League of Nations. A number of pundits have recently noted the parallels between the United Kingdom's experience eight decades ago and the United States' today. The comparisons, however, have generally centered on the early and middle phases of both occupations. Too few have focused on the ignominious end of the United Kingdom's reign in Mesopotamia and the lessons those events hold for the United States today. In fact, Washington's current position bears a strong resemblance to London's in the late 1920s, when the British were responsible for the tutelage of a fledgling Iraqi state suffering from immature institutions, active insurgencies, and the interference of hostile neighbors.

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Full Text (3895  words)

(Copyright 2006 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved.)

HOW THE BRITISH QUIT MESOPOTAMIA

The United States was not the first country in the last hundred years to occupy Iraq. That distinction belongs to the United Kingdom, which seized the provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul from the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and formally took control of the new country in 1920, under a mandate from the League of Nations.

A number of pundits have recently noted the parallels between the United Kingdom's experience eight decades ago and the United States' today. The comparisons, however, have generally centered on the early and middle phases of both occupations. Too few have focused on the ignominious end of the United Kingdom's reign in Mesopotamia and the lessons those events hold for the United States today. In fact, Washington's current position bears a strong resemblance to London's in the late 1920s, when the British were responsible for the tutelage of a fledgling Iraqi state suffering from immature institutions, active insurgencies, and the interference of hostile neighbors. Eventually, this tutelage was undermined by pressure from the British Parliament and the press to withdraw -- forces quite similar to those in the United States now calling for a withdrawal from Iraq. Building a better understanding of the United Kingdom's mistakes -- and of the consequences of that country's ultimate withdrawal from Iraq -- could thus help illuminate the present occupation and provide answers to when and how to end it. If the British record teaches anything, it is this: costly and frustrating as the fostering of Iraqi democracy may be, the costs of leaving the job undone would likely be far higher, for both the occupiers and the Iraqis. This is a lesson the British learned more than seven decades ago, when their premature pullout in 1932 led to more violence in Iraq, the rise of a dictatorship, and a catastrophic unraveling of everything the British had tried to build there.

AN UNPOPULAR OCCUPATION

The British occupation of Iraq drew heavy criticism at home almost from its inception. In 1920, a large-scale Shiite insurgency cost the British more than 2,000 casualties, and domestic pressure to withdraw from Iraq began to build. In the revolt's aftermath, the war hero T. E. Lawrence led a chorus of critics in the press and Parliament denouncing London's decision to continue the costly occupation. "The people of England," Lawrence wrote, have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honour. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information. ... Things have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient than the public knows. It is a disgrace to our imperial record, and may soon be too inflamed for any ordinary cure. We are to-day not far from a disaster....

"We say we are in Mesopotamia to develop it for the benefit of the world. ... How long will we permit millions of pounds, thousands of Imperial troops, and tens of thousands of Arabs to be sacrificed on behalf of colonial administration which can benefit nobody but its administrators?" Although the London Times remained mainly supportive of the government's policy in Iraq, other leading British papers, most notably the Manchester Guardian, echoed Lawrence's call to end the occupation.

The result was what historians have called the "Quit Mesopotamia" campaign, which remained an issue in British politics until the end of the British mandate in Iraq in 1932. For more than a decade, a diverse collection of anti-imperialists, pacifists, Labourites, and Lawrence loyalists kept up a steady stream of criticism in the United Kingdom's opposition press. The Quit Mesopotamia critics effectively tapped into the British sentiment against imperialism, which had become widespread after the end of World War I. The British public's interest in maintaining a worldwide empire had waned; the working classes, which had sacrificed so much for the war, wanted their government to invest in the stagnant domestic economy, not in costly imperial adventures. Unlike their ally the United States, the United Kingdom experienced no economic boom in the Roaring Twenties, and unemployment steadily rose throughout the decade. British voters registered their disapproval of the Conservatives' imperialist tendencies by voting the Labour Party of Ramsay MacDonald into power in 1923. Although that Labour government was short-lived (thanks to a scandal), the Conservatives got the message and in 1925 initiated a series of increasingly desperate measures to sell their Iraq policy to the public.

Colonial Secretary Leopold Amery led the rhetorical charge. In speeches in Parliament and before audiences throughout England, Amery blasted critics for their "reckless disregard ... of the honour of their country." Calls by British newspapers to pull out of Iraq only emboldened the country's enemies, Amery said, and a "policy of scuttle" would expose the British to far greater dangers than those they would encounter while "fulfilling [their] obligations" to the Iraqi people. The London Times weighed in on Amery's behalf on September 25, 1925, observing that the "cost of premature withdrawal" would probably be a Turkish invasion of Mosul.

Amery claimed that the situation in Iraq was significantly better than his critics realized. Returning from a fact-finding tour of the mandate in 1925, he said that Iraq's development was proceeding well enough to promise the British a "substantial return" on their investment in that country. The whole Middle East was undergoing fundamental changes, he declared, and Iraq would soon be a model of development and democracy for the entire region. Besides, he said, Iraq was serving as "a splendid training ground" for the Royal Air Force (RAF), which since 1922 had been charged with defending Iraq and maintaining order there.

These arguments made little impression on the opponents of the occupation. The Labour Party accused the Conservatives of wanting to remain in Iraq for the sake of oil stockholders. "We should never get out of [Iraq] without wrenching something, such as the national honour or the interests of bondholders," declared the senior Labour Party MP and future prime minister Clement Attlee in Parliament in 1926. "Therefore," he said, "we had better wrench free at once."

Nonetheless, Amery's public defense of the occupation helped the policy withstand parliamentary challenges in 1925 and 1926, and the United Kingdom's occupation looked set to continue indefinitely. In accepting the League of Nations mandate in 1920, the British government had committed itself to at least 20 years of guardianship of Iraq's state and society, and when it signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1926, London promised to stick around until 1951 (or until an independent Iraq joined the league). Yet starting in 1925, the Conservatives began secretly looking for a way out. In 1927 -- just one year after pledging to stay in Iraq for a quarter century -- key ministers in Stanley Baldwin's government proposed a pullout. According to Robert Cecil, a trusted Baldwin adviser, withdrawal from Iraq would be "a complete answer to those of our critics who allege that we are anxious to have a militarist or adventurous foreign policy. That charge has done us a great deal of harm already and may easily be fatal to our existence at the next election."

Publicly, the Conservatives began to speak about the need to "reduce expenditure" in Iraq. In 1925, Sir Samuel Hoare, head of the Air Ministry and another close Baldwin adviser, acknowledged that "since the war we [have] spent a great deal in the Middle East, and the British taxpayer [has] asked whether the expenditure was worthwhile, and whether it could be reduced." Returning from a trip to Iraq that year, Hoare announced that once the contested frontier near Mosul was settled with Turkey, the British could reduce their role in Iraq. As a government minister, Hoare could not have made this declaration without Baldwin's approval; his statement therefore had the effect of an official promise to bring home some British troops. And indeed, the Conservatives soon made the promise a reality: by early 1927, the Baldwin government had pulled most British soldiers out of Iraq, leaving a few RAF squadrons and a battalion of Indian infantry to defend the country alongside a fledgling Iraqi army of only 9,000 men.

DEFINING DEVIANCY DOWN

Although the pullout may have been expedient in one sense for Baldwin's government, it was also politically awkward. After all, the United Kingdom had publicly promised to stay in Iraq for years. If it was going to extricate itself quickly, it needed a way to save face in the process. And finding one was difficult, for Iraq had hardly made the kind of progress the Conservatives had originally predicted.

In taking on the mission in Iraq, the British had set out ambitious benchmarks for their trustee's development. When Sir Arnold Wilson, Britain's high commissioner in Iraq, announced the mandate to Iraqis in May 1920, he proclaimed that the United Kingdom's aim was to create "a healthy body politic, guided and controlled by healthy public opinion." Just six months later, Wilson's successor, the diplomat Sir Percy Cox, told Iraqis their government should be formed "by the people themselves" through a "National Congress fully representative of the people." In keeping with these principles, the Colonial Office's annual public reports on Iraq indicated that success in the country would be measured by the establishment of political stability, real security, and the protection of minority rights.

By 1925, however, the Conservative government began to recognize that Iraq was scoring poorly in all those areas. This meant that the only way to leave with honor would be to redefine the standards of success and overstate Iraq's achievements. Beginning in 1925, the British proceeded to do just that: over the next seven years, London's progress reports to the League of Nations increasingly diverged from reality. British officials consistently minimized their commitments and proclaimed Iraq's progress in public, even while privately acknowledging widespread, serious problems.

The worst of these problems was Iraq's lack of security. As the United Kingdom scaled back its garrisons in Iraq, it left the country increasingly exposed to hostile neighbors. British commanders in Baghdad, unlike their political bosses in London, recognized the dangers in this approach and strained to find a feasible scheme for defending the country with fewer troops. A 1926 RAF study recommended establishing a string of border forts and pacifying the armed raiders who would periodically surge out of Syria and Transjordan to attack Iraqi tribes and ambush convoys on the desert roads. But British commanders were given no men with which to implement the defense plan.

Instead, in March 1927, the Baldwin government proclaimed the Iraqi army capable of defending the country itself and withdrew the last battalion of British ground troops. Mere months later, southern Iraq came under attack by thousands of Wahhabi Ikhwan ("brothers"). The Ikhwan were a puritanical sect that had brutally conquered the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1924. Like today's insurgents under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Ikhwan were Salafi fighters who invaded Iraq from the desert to terrorize its Shiites (whom the Salafi consider apostates). For the better part of two years, starting in 1927, all that stood between the Ikhwan and the lightly armed Iraqi tribes was a small desert detachment of British-trained Iraqi troops under the leadership of Captain John Glubb, who would later head the Arab Legion in Transjordan. Only with great difficulty did Glubb obtain occasional air support from the overstretched RAF squadrons stationed near Basra and Baghdad.

British officials were slow to grasp the extent of the Ikhwan threat. The British high commissioner in Iraq at the time, Sir Henry Dobbs, declared the Ikhwan defeated in 1928. Acknowledging that the Wahhabi invaders had hurt Iraq's economy by discouraging foreign investment, he informed the press that "the only grave injury done to Iraq ... [has] been inflicted by wild reports manufacturing scare after scare." In fact, although no official report was ever conducted, it is probable that the Ikhwan managed to kill hundreds of Iraqis. Dobbs' assessment of the Ikhwan's strength, meanwhile, was also wrong: the next year, they invaded again, in large numbers. Indeed, the Ikhwan continued to threaten Iraq until they were routed by the army of Ibn Saud in mid-1929.

During this same period, the resurgent Turkey of Mustafa Kemal (better known as Atatrk) threatened Iraq from the north. Kemalist Turkey mounted an unsuccessful invasion of Mosul in 1922 and thereafter continually intrigued against Iraqi rule among the Kurdish tribes in the region. Like Iraq's Sunni Arabs today, the Kurds of the mandate period represented a communal threat that consumed the attention and resources of the Iraqi state. With Turkish support, the Pesh Merga of the Barzani tribe and its allies were able to sustain an insurgency against the Iraqi government for almost four years. At one point, the Iraqi army was forced to deploy three-quarters of its strength in the Kurdish Sulaimaniya region in an attempt to put down the insurgents. In the spring of 1931, as the formal handover of sovereignty to the Iraqis approached, the British roused themselves to pacify the Kurds for good. For over a month, the RAF bombed Kurdish villages, finally forcing the rebels to capitulate.

Under the mandate, Iraq's next biggest problem -- which the British government also routinely downplayed -- was its politics. Although London's public reports to the League of Nations throughout the 1920s sang the praises of Iraq's new institutions, by the end of the decade British officials had begun to acknowledge privately that the Iraqi government had become the exclusive domain of the royal Hashemite family and a few hundred Sunni Arab politicians. This was hardly the liberal, westernized polity the British had set out to create in 1920. But as the end of the mandate approached -- and domestic demands for withdrawal grew louder -- British officials abandoned plans for a real democracy in Iraq. "My hope," wrote High Commissioner Dobbs, "is that ... [Iraq] may be able to rub along in a corrupt, inefficient, oriental sort of way, something better than she was under Turkish rule. ... If this is the result, even though it be not a very splendid one, we shall have built better than we knew."

Both Dobbs and his successor, Sir Francis Humphrys, believed that the United Kingdom should simply validate the rule of the Sunni elite in Iraq and let them govern without oversight. Both men reported to London that appeasing Iraq's urban Sunni Arabs was the key to the country's stability, and since the Sunnis wanted the British to leave, both Dobbs and Humphrys advised London to do so. Their assessments ignored the fact that Iraq's Sunni elite planned to consolidate its control of the country by excluding from politics Iraq's Shiites, Kurds, and smaller minorities. These disenfranchised groups, however, could read the writing on the wall and viewed the prospect of a British withdrawal with alarm; by 1929, they had come to view British administrators as a check against Sunni domination.

The League of Nations mandate had stipulated that Iraq's minorities should be protected, and throughout the 1920s, the British had promised social and economic equity to groups such as the Assyrians and the Kurds. But the British government's political maneuvers in the late 1920s made securing minority rights impossible. Seeking to quiet its critics at home, in late 1929 the British government announced its intention to terminate the mandate in 1932. London followed this announcement in 1930 by signing a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty that spelled out British rights in Iraq but contained no language protecting Iraq's minorities. The announcement that the mandate would be terminated effectively turned the British administrators into lame ducks. After that, the Sunnis, anticipating the British withdrawal, simply stonewalled all British efforts to secure specific minority rights.

Even as they recommended that the League of Nations accept Iraq as a fully independent member, some British officials began to privately warn their colleagues that Iraq's new, British-built institutions had not had time to mature and that chaos might follow the British pullout. A contemporary report written at the Royal Institute of International Affairs documented the fear that Iraq was being allowed to "run before it could walk." In Baghdad, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (a senior British adviser) warned London that if it left too soon, "My own prediction is that [the Iraqis] will all fly at each other's throats and that there will be a bad slump in the administration that will continue until someone strong enough to dominate the country emerges, or, alternatively, until we have to step in and intervene." In the course of events, both of these predictions came to pass.

Yet none of these private misgivings were ever made public. Instead, with breathtaking mendacity, report after report praised Iraq's progress. In September 1929, Cornwallis' superiors in London declared that "Iraq, judged by the criteria of internal security, sound public finance, and enlightened administration, would be in every way fit for admission to the League of Nations by 1932." In order to have Iraq meet this standard, of course, the British government had already dramatically lowered the bar. Dobbs declared that it was unrealistic to expect that "Iraq should from the first be able to challenge comparison with the most highly developed and civilized nations of the modern world." In his opinion, Iraq would be ready for full independence as soon as it was "at least as stable as China, Portugal, Greece, or Abyssinia" -- arguably the four weakest members of the League of Nations.

THINGS FALL APART

In retrospect, it seems clear that the political and public pressure of the Quit Mesopotamia campaign led the British government first to overstate its progress in Iraq and then to abandon the project too early -- with disastrous consequences. London's decision to withdraw British troops by 1927 left Iraq unable to resist either the Wahhabi invasion or the Kurdish insurgency. The British government's premature announcements of Iraqi independence actually undermined security in the country by causing the various factions to begin positioning themselves for a civil war once the British left.

When the mandate actually ended in 1932, Iraq's British-built institutions began, one by one, to collapse. With the occupiers gone, Iraq's Sunni Arab elite used the army not to defend the state against foreign invaders, but to suppress Iraq's Assyrians, Kurds, and Shiites. The Iraqi army of the 1930s was the most dangerous kind: it was easily the most powerful institution in the country, too strong to be checked by other groups and free from any real constitutional constraints, but it was also too weak to actually defend Iraq from outsiders. As the British-installed King Faisal lay dying in Switzerland in 1933, Iraqi troops massacred Assyrians in northern Iraq and returned to Baghdad as heroes. Army leaders then used their newfound prestige to meddle in the country's politics, backing certain factions in parliament in return for the passage of conscription laws that bolstered the army's strength but turned young Shiite men into a military underclass. By 1936, Iraq's generals had gathered enough power to carry out a military coup, ending constitutional government and setting a precedent that would recur again and again.

At the same time, Iraqi society, the most ethnically diverse in the Arab world, came fully under the sway of Sunni Arab chauvinists. Typical of this development was the fate of Iraq's educational system, which fell under the control of Sati al-Husri, a Syrian pan-Arabist who taught that Shiite Islam was heretical. Under his influence, the Iraqi government began to suppress Shiite religious holidays and practices -- a policy that sparked large-scale Shiite uprisings in the mid-1930s. By the 1940s, Iraq, one of the least Sunni of all Arab states, had become a bulwark of what historian Elie Kedourie called "the Sunni spirit of domination."

The coups following 1936 mostly involved the Sunni Arab officer corps. By 1939, Iraq's military rulers had become openly hostile to the United Kingdom. When war broke out in Europe, Baghdad opened back channels to the Axis powers, and it finally offered up the country to Hitler in 1941. Faced with the prospect of an Axis stronghold on their line of communication to India, the British were forced to invade Iraq once again. As British troops approached Baghdad, Iraqi soldiers and police carried out a final act of official butchery, slaughtering hundreds of Iraqi Jews. There followed a second British occupation of the country that lasted until 1948.

Had the United Kingdom stayed longer the first time around, much of this mayhem could have been avoided. Continued British oversight would have prevented the Iraqi government from falling into the hands of military dictators, and the presence of a British force in the country would likely have restrained the Iraqi army from preying on Iraq's minority communities. Since the British had opposed Iraqi conscription throughout the 1920s, it is safe to assume they would have continued to do so if the mandate had been extended, thereby removing a significant irritant from the relationships among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities. The typically pragmatic British political advisers would also have been unlikely to allow Sunni Arab supremacists to pervert Iraq's public educational system.

These restraints could have helped Iraq develop into a more stable society, in which Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, and other minorities would have somehow found a way to live together peacefully. Instead, these groups spent the next 70 years of Iraq's independence with daggers drawn, each decade pocked by civil war.

OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS

Like the U.S.-led coalition today, the United Kingdom of the 1920s began its Iraq project by pledging long-term support for Iraq's defense and development. In the ensuing years, the British encountered a set of problems similar to those facing today's coalition: deep ethnic and sectarian divisions, an internal Iraqi power struggle, the infiltration of Salafi terrorists from neighboring countries, active insurgencies carried on by minority groups, and hostile regional powers across the borders. And once again, these seemingly intractable problems and their associated violence have spawned an intense movement to end the occupation of Iraq -- to quit Mesopotamia.

Washington thus now finds itself facing roughly the same question that London faced between 1925 and 1927: Should it leave Iraq, or continue until its project there has truly fulfilled its aims? In the British case, both sides of the debate -- the Quit Mesopotamia critics and the Conservative officials who minimized Iraq's problems -- apparently believed that the United Kingdom could leave Iraq without repercussions, regardless of whether the mandate had actually served its purpose. They came to assume that an independent Iraq would somehow muddle along -- and that if it did not, the consequences would not affect the British.

Accordingly, the Conservative government succumbed to the political and media pressure to pull out. After 1925, as British officials continued to pay lip service to the original goals of the mandate, they privately began looking for ways to withdraw early, even though many of them recognized that chaos would ensue. To avoid a similar result today, the U.S. government and its allies must confront what the United Kingdom's premature withdrawal achieved: namely, disaster both for Iraq and for its occupier. Having left the work of the mandate undone, the British were forced to return and attempt to finish the job nine misery-filled years later. The United States can ill afford to do the same.

Indexing (document details)

Subjects:
History,  Foreign policy,  Military occupations

Classification Codes
9190 United States,  9175 Western Europe,  9178 Middle East

Locations:
United Kingdom,  UK,  United States,  US,  Iraq

Author(s):
Joel Rayburn

Document types:
Feature

Publication title:
Foreign Affairs. New York: Mar/Apr 2006. Vol. 85, Iss. 2;  pg. 29

Source type:
Periodical

ISSN:
00157120

ProQuest document ID:
996893171

Text Word Count
3895

Document URL:
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=996893171&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=28215&RQT=309&VName=PQD

Woo…

Insomnia…

It’s one of those things that in itself isn’t inherently a bad thing.   It’s not the insomnia itself that breads that feeling of angst, the dread or anxiety.  Insomnia, well, it can be counted as a blessing in some circles.  I know, for myself, I’ve done some of my best work in the middle of the night.  You know, those 3 AM moments of Zen where you come to realizations.

Instantly what’s called to mind is the fond memories of Monsieur Meursault, in The Stranger.  I remember the profound liberation experienced by Meursault, a man who didn’t fit in with the world.  A man who, accepted his destiny, in that he was responsible for his actions because of free will.  The consequences of his actions, immoral, moral, or amoral, but those consequences were his own. 

"As if that blind rage had washed me clean, rid me of hope; for the first time, in that night alive with signs and stars, I opened myself up to the gentle indifference of the world. Finding it so much like myself - so like a brother, really - I felt that I had been happy and that I was happy again. For everything to be consummated, for me to feel less alone, I had only to wish that there be a large crowd of spectators the day of my execution and that they greet me with cries of hate."

Albert Camus (L'etranger), Part 2, Chapter 5, pg. 122-3

Going full circle, the dread and angst of Anxiety is not of the experience itself, but of the anticipation of the feeling physically poor.  Well, ultimately, it is a double edged sword.  Why at the same time there are those negative repercussions, I, once again, cherish the night.  The silence, the stillness, the ability to walk outside and look up at the stars.  It was during these periods I wrote my master’s thesis, many a paper, a publication and even these entries that no one reads.  Moreover, it’s only during the cold winters night that in all of my travel’s I have been able to look up at the night sky and see my old companion Orion.  No matter what is going on in my life, the world, I’ve always taken comfort in looking up and seeing that constellation.  I remember a trip through IL, the cold darkness of night, miles and miles of literally nothing.  It was something out of a bad horror film.  I was driving my red accord, 84, it was a tank.  I rolled down my window and it was probably about 2 or 3 AM.  I looked up and, because there was very little city light I could see so many stars.  It was Orion that stood out, my traveling companion. There was no need to worry, no need to fret, no need to well…anything, as at that singular moment everyone who I cared about and/or cared about me was under that same sky, overlooked by those same stars. 

Anyway, the blessing and the curse… I wouldn’t give up the curse for anything (though I might be groggy for the first half of the day)!

See you tomorrow.

All of this has happened before and all of this will happen again…

Happy New Year from London!

To anyone who reads this:

I hope you and yours have an absolutely awesome New Year!

Auld Lang Syne

Should auld acquaintance be forgot
and never brought to mind?
Should auld acquaintance be forgot
and days of auld lang syne?
For auld lang syne, my dear,
for auld lang syne,
we'll take a cup of kindness yet,
for auld lang syne.

Should auld acquaintance be forgot
and never brought to mind?
Should auld acquaintance be forgot
and days of auld lang syne?
And here's a hand, my trusty friend
And gie's a hand o' thine
We'll take a cup of kindness yet
For auld lang syne

12/29/2008 8:42 PM GMT

Well a “full day” in London has essentially come and gone. It’s amazing how much colder it is/was here.  When we left Philadelphia it was like ~65 degree’s F.  As we packed and headed off to the Airport it was like a nasty summer day.  Then once we got to the UK it was below freezing.  We unpacked the coach, were exhausted and just got situated.  My brother and I came back, unpacked, showered and he went to sleep.  I on the other hand was going to nap; however, as I prepared to upload the latest set of pictures etc., I realized I had forgotten my USB cable for the camera.   I got up, got dressed and started headed towards the Thames.  I crossed the Golden Jubilee Bridge, walked about the London Eye (decided I was going to take him there later).  I wandered about Charring Cross Station, Trafalgar square and to Ten Downing Street.   I headed back, uploaded some shots and then finally laid down for a bit.  My brother had to be up for some practice, then, thereafter we headed down to Strand (street), found some dinner, walked over to the now closed London Eye and came back. He isn’t exactly the most adventurous when it comes to food so our dinner was a bit…boring.  I did however have a real Bass Ale at the bar, and came back to start winding down for the night.  I’ve, we’ve, been up for quite awhile and I’m fairly fatigued etc.

Anyway, tomorrow we’re headed to Buckingham and the off to the countryside.  I’ll post more pictures and updates tomorrow. Till then, I hope all is well.

-Johnathon
http://community.webshots.com/user/johnathonm

12/29/2008 2:48:20 AM GMT

All the joys of travel…I don’t anything will ever take away from the joy screaming kids, the old lady who decides to lean her chair back well beyond any degree of “reasonability”.  It is my luck so it would seem.  I am barely able to type.  I looked over at my brother and asked him if she was dead, alas, she is not as he indicated that she gave me a really dirty look.  Ahh…coach class. I’ll never forget the good of days of flying to and from the west coast (similar length flight) and having about 10 people on the flight.  I was able to spread out across three seats, sleep, and sprawl out my research and the like.  I wonder if I could handle that whole trek now.  The going to class all week then hoping on a flight out west, working all weekend and then coming back to Philadelphia for a 10 am class that Monday morning, ahh the memories…sniff.

Anyway, the food on the flight was ok, though as always I’m a bit skeptical of airline food as it has the lovely reputation for not being so lovely.  It was this “pot roast” with mash potato’s, peas and carrots.  The salad was some yucky feta cheese and cranberry things, and the balsamic dressing…well it was sickly sweet (too much sugar).  It was nice to have a real Coke though.  There is nothing in the world like it.  Everywhere but in the US it seems they still make soda the real way, with sugar.  The stuff we get at home in the states with its nasty high fructose corn syrup – yuck. It’s also interesting to look at the introduction of high fructose corn syrup into our food supply (~1980) and correlate that with obesity rates.  Essentially with the data you’ll see an absurd correlation. 

Moving along, we’re currently just south of  Greenland (~250 mlles). We’re traveling at ~940 mph Eastward and we’re about 1800 Miles from London.   I’m not sure if anyone will read this just know that the 6 hours of the baby crying and the smelly old lady leaning her seat to far back make it all worthwhile.  I’d try and get a picture of it but I’m not sure how well that would fly.  I’d need to use the flash – and that, if she’s not dead of course, would probably wake her up. 
What else, well I watched Hellboy 2 for the first part of the flight.  It wasn’t a bad movie and it simply was what it was, nothing to deep, and nothing to serious.  Oh, the baby is still crying -just In case you were wondering. 
Haha…it’s like something out of a bad movie.  The baby screaming for six hours, the dead old lady, the delicious food…truly hell is an airport experience.  Mind you, I love traveling, love being aboard and the whole thing – I just am a bit cynical at the moment after….the 3rd straight hour of the baby screaming.   At this rate we’ll be getting into our hotel around 7 AM GMT (baggage recovery not withstanding).  I’m not sure what the day entails but I’m hoping it’s somewhat low key or that we get a chance to break the jet lag. 

All right, parents, kiddies, friends and family.  My neck hurts from the dead old lady in front of me so I’m signing off for now.  I’ll update again once we get into London.  I should have pictures to upload and the works.

I know from looking at Google earth we’re right across from Buckingham Palace and directly across the Thames from the giant Ferris wheel.  It’ll be dark or the sun just coming up when we get in so – we’ll see how what I can take pictures of as we arrive.  

-Johnathon
http://community.webshots.com/user/johnathonm

12/28/2008 5:30 PM EDT

Well it’s been about 2-3 hours since we arrived at the airport.  It’s funny how almost every travel experience is the same.  I’ve come to the conclusion that hell is an airport and that the seventh level of hell is a baggage claim.  It’s interesting to just watch – people coming, people going, from all over the world.  I’m sitting here in the waiting area outside gate A17 for British Airways.  Our flight is leaving around 7 PM EST.  I just took my brother out for food to Chickie and Pete’s.  The wings were good, the fries were good and he had a burger.  I told him it’s a good thing he ate up as the Brit’s aren’t exactly known for their cuisine.   The Eagles are actually making some sort of rally and people are celebrating over on the other side of the lounge.  I, myself, am tired and am hoping to get some sleep on the flight. We’re expected to arrive in around 7 AM GMT.  I’m going to take some pictures and I’ll try and write some more while I’m on the plane. 

-Johnathon

Current Photos

Less than Ordinary…

I’ve always had a hard time finding my place in this world...

Never knowing my truth worth...

I could settle for less and an ordinary life...

Dragging My Feet and as such, Time Will Tell.

It’s kind of interesting the extreme lengths that we are willing to go in order to procrastinate.  Take, for instance, writing in this blog.  I generally have used it as an outlet for various academic pieces or my own meanderings about life.  I don’t think anyone reads or even views this document.  Yet, despite that fact, I still continue to try and post at least once a week.  Though, back to the procrastination bit, I decided to put off doing this for a bit too.  However, tonight, I resolved myself to post.  Thus my little bit about procrastination. 

Anyway, I’m currently working on a piece relating to the obligations of the first responder in mass causality/fatality incidents. This piece is going to center upon the philosophical ramifications and “obligations” of the responder and it will be contextualized within a modern legal framework.  I’m on draft two and working with a colleague of mine (a lawyer) on refining this further.  We’ll see how it all turns out. I am excited about the paper and I hope, whoever reads it, will be too.

They call me "Solo"...

Well, when I was born, my mother considered giving me up for adoption several times. My father wasn't really around and she figured I'd end up alone one way or another. 

I think that's really fitting for the very despondent tone that's settled in with me over the course of the weekend.  I've had weird dreams about my family (the ones who have been passed for several years), had horrible realizations about them (seeing something on the History Channel) and just being alone.  I've made mistakes in my life, hurt people, been hurt, loved, longed, yearned and strived to ascertain meaning from all the current sum of my experiences.

I know my own experiences at the moment, even at their worst would be their best... it's all relative, I understand that logically.  However it doesn't mean things don't hurt as much inside nor does it minimize either of our experiences.

They say it can only get better...when you stop looking you'll find it.  Well... have at it then.

The Joy of Article Revision

It's funny how an article begins to blur itself. The longer you work on a piece the more difficult it is to spot what needs to be changed/adapted.  You can read over something 10,000 times and just miss that one word that could change everything or how a different phrasing of something could solidify your argument perfectly.  I've been looking at this piece for a few days now and it's at that point where it's all the same.  I'm hoping to submit the piece for publication though, at present, it still needs some work. I think I'm going to walk away from it for a bit or see if I can find another set of eyes to read over this piece. 

Oh and what's with the weather being 9,001 degrees? Geesh :)

Arthouse BS

It is amazing what people will argue and the lengths people will go to justify their methods or purpose.  I recently sat through a presentation relating to design methodology. The point of this lecture was to discuss the design process and to bridge the gap with the business operations process.  I sat there through these pieces and it became clear to me that the ideas they were espousing were and are a walking contradiction. 

"Design doesn't want to be in commodities"

"The market rejects a design or concept because it "isn't read for it" [professor referred to this as MAYA principle].

This went on for over two hours and gradually degraded into art house crap in that they ended up showing a coffee pot that bent over to give you your coffee. 

Now, I'm a pragmatic realist.  I sat through this and realized I was listening to verbal diarrhea.  I also recognized it was a ploy to sell someone on their "end products" - like the tea pot. 

Inherently, these developments recognize and seize upon market related needs and wants.  However, the creation of and recognition of opportunity/value creation is a team based effort within the Timmon's model.  Thus, the professor was arguing for the designer as the be all end all force of the value chain when in reality they are a part of and receiver model plan.  They create the prototype and this goes through a refinement process which yields and end result.

Everything is a team orientation and the recognition of creating value from the opportunity is what counts.  The model of a for profit business isn't going to be for a tea pot that bows, that's a novelty and art house shit.  What will generate profits is the creation of a service or feature set that is constantly evolving.  The heart of design is creation, the heart of a business is creation, the value derived from both is relativistic.  A good firm can make something both pretty and functional.  This can reach a broader market.  The tea pot, well that was shit.  The combined resources of quantitatively oriented individuals with artistic individuals, now that can lead to something very interesting.

If you're selling me art house shit, I'm going to call it what it is, shit.  If you're selling me a concept that is marketable and has a product line intertwined with it, then we're talking (or services).

The Power of Words

It's very interesting when you think about the power of words and the tone of the context those words create/provide.  Take for instance the concept of capitalism and the model of the entrepreneur.  The constructs utilized in our in course discussions have centered upon recognizing opportunity and "exploiting" it.  Now exploit is a loaded term in and unto itself.  I think it could be argued that this has a negative connotation.  Mind you I am a capitalist and understand what is trying to be conveyed here.  However, I wonder if there is a better way to unify the concepts of capitalizing on an opportunity while, at the same time, generating a profit.  This can be done without exploitation. In the recognition of the "opportunity" one can go forward and create value in a way that benefits one's self and one's stakeholders.

In short, words have a powerful connotation that can subconsciously define or outline behavior.  One can only wonder if groups like Enron instead of exploiting opportunity actually maneuvered to create value from that recognition.  

To conclude I would argue that capitalism can be ethical and mutually beneficial to all parties involved.  It is a matter of behaving in a way to maximize the benefits to all parties involved.  If this is done, everyone can come out ahead.

Day 1 – Disaster Medicine and Management on Campus

Discussion of Communications and relevance to incidents.

1. Establishing a model/guidelines for an incident.
2. Extreme’s example – Hurricane Katrina, September 11, 2001; Anomalies
3. Model basis should be realistic in scope/size to establish model.
4. Playing 911 tapes from 9/11/01 – dialogue between responder and dispatch.  World trade center “send everyone” – it looks like it was intentional – could be a terrorist act.
5. Communications theory model:
1. Message transmitted
2. Encoder/interpreter/decoder
3. message reply
4. Encoder/interpreter/decoder
1. Osgood & Schramm Model
2. If we don’t know the message has been received, then we don’t know if we communicated.
3. Receiver –> Message –> Feedback
1. Intolerable in a disaster scene.
2. Order communicated, and don’t respond, insubordination.
6. E.G. of spin - Audio tape from 50’s – demonstrating Atomic Bomb detonation.  Optimistic and demo – breaks in with an alert –the wind shifted and the fallout will fall on St. George, Utah. 
7. Important to know the limitations
1. Dead area
2. Heavy radio traffic
3. Their own voice – modulation of voice [enunciate]
4. Open carrier [holds down push to talk]
5. Mumblers…
8. Engine 5 and 6 example [good and bad communication]
1. Audio examples
2. Yelling messages are unintelligible over radio communication and can over excite the situation.
3. Catlett,VA Example.  Chief goes with a personal car –to scene.  The Chief radios pumping unit, radio back and forth over missing, Chief getting angry, Driver angry and sped up hill.  Hit by train.
9. Characteristics of Effective Communication
1. Clear and Calm
2. No first or last names
3. No ten codes
4. No yelling
5. Acknowledge message received
6. No EMOTION
7. Stay Clear and Calm
10. Radio Communications
1. Brevity (FCC 90.403C)
2. Permissible (FCC 90.403D)
1. “Ask self – is this message necessary?”
2. Example of Meridian One fire [Philadelphia, PA] and the loss of three firefighters.
3. Frequency and repeaters
4. When planning – radios don’t meet the need of the bigger picture – towers etc. need to be factored into the equation.
3. Interference (FCC 90.403E)
4. Permissible (FCC 90.405)
5. Virginia Tech discussion in the communications breakdown.  More to follow with John Giduck.

"Mujahideen Secrets ver 2.0". - A PsyOp and PR Strategy

Psychological Operations (PSYOP, PSYOPS), are techniques used by military and police forces to influence a target audience's emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior. Target audiences can be governments, organizations, groups, and individuals, and are used in order to induce confessions, or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives. These are sometimes combined with black operations or false flag tactics.

This concept has been used by military institutions throughout history, but it is only since the twentieth century that it has been accorded the organizational and professional status it enjoys now.

The word is commonly used by governments, such as the United States, who do not wish to use the term propaganda, which would mar their image. The word propaganda has very negative connotations, and by calling it psychological operations instead, people are much more likely to support it, where they would be unlikely to support the use of "propaganda". This euphemistic naming scheme is ironically an example of psychological operations -- i.e. using psychological techniques to persuade a large number of people to support something that they wouldn't normally support.^[1]

^{1. Dougherty, William: "A Psychological Warfare Casebook", John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979}

 

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Updated encryption tool for al-Qaeda backers improves on first version, researcher says
Jaikumar Vijayan

February 04, 2008 (Computerworld) A recently released tool that allegedly was designed to help al-Qaeda supporters encrypt their Internet-based communications is a well-written and easily portable piece of code, according to a security researcher who has analyzed the software.

However, messages that are encrypted using the tool, which is known as Mujahideen Secrets 2, should be relatively easy for law enforcement authorities to spot and track, said Paul Henry, vice president of technology evangelism at Secure Computing Corp. in San Jose.

Henry said that based on his analysis of the encryption tool, "it will not be a difficult matter for law enforcement to identify files created using this software," because it puts a unique fingerprint on them. "You may not be able to read the messages, but you will be able to figure out where it was sent from and to whom," he added.

Mujahideen Secrets 2 was released last month via an Arabic-language Web site set up by an Islamic forum called al-Ekhlaas. At the time, the password-protected Web site was running on a server that belonged to a Web hosting firm in Tampa, Fla., after previously being on a system owned by another company in Rochester, Minn. But the URL that the group was using on the server in Tampa is no longer working.

As of last week, the al-Ekhlaas site had been moved to a server owned by yet another hosting firm, this one based in Phoenix, Henry said. But the link to the site on that server also now appears to be broken.

The new encryption software is an updated version of an easier-to-crack tool that was released early last year by the same group. Henry said the copy of Mujahideen Secrets 2 that he evaluated was provided to him by J.M. Berger, a Cambridge, Mass.-based freelance journalist and documentary filmmaker who focuses on terrorism as well as science and business topics.

Mujahideen Secrets 2 is a very compelling piece of software, from an encryption perspective, according to Henry. He said the new tool is easy to use and provides 2,048-bit encryption, an improvement over the 256-bit AES encryption supported in the original version. What makes the update especially interesting, he noted, is the fact that it can be used to encrypt Yahoo and MSN chat messages in addition to e-mails.

Another interesting aspect of the tool is its ability to take a binary file and encrypt it in such a way that the file can be posted in a pure ASCII or text-only format, Henry added. As a result, individuals could use Mujahideen Secrets 2 to encrypt files and post them on sites that aren't even on the Internet -- for instance, on a telephone-accessed bulletin board system. "If you wanted to do something covert, that's one way of doing it," Henry said.

The new version of the tool also has a much better graphical user interface than the initial release did, he noted. And he thinks the tool's developers have done a better job of integrating bits and pieces of RSA Security Inc.'s encryption code in order to handle functions such as key generation and key management. Many of the mistakes they made in the first version seem to have been addressed in the new one, thereby making it harder to crack, he said.

In addition, the revamped tool is highly portable, Henry said. For instance, he explained, someone could put the software on a USB memory stick, go to an Internet cafe, plug in the USB device and run Mujahideen Secrets 2 to encrypt any communications from that cafe.

According to Berger, the new version of the tool sounds worrisome both because of its increased sophistication and the ease with which it can be used. The software appears to be designed for use by relatively low-level operators in the al-Qaeda hierarchy, he said.

The capabilities offered by Mujahideen Secrets 2 fit a pattern for al-Qaeda groups, Berger said, noting that the terrorist organization "has always been pretty current with what they use — cutting edge, but not bleeding edge."

Berger added that there is a "robust discussion" taking place within the counterterrorism community over the issue of online forums such as al-Ekhlaas being hosted on U.S.-based servers. Some people believe it is easier to monitor what's going on in the forums when they are hosted on U.S.-based servers, he said. Others, though, want the Web sites to be taken down immediately.

Source: http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9060939

EMERGENCY PERSONNEL AS TARGETS

Any WMD training exercise should be an all hazard approach for all the agencies in the system.

In the given area where the EMS work I would want a hazard analysis of the possibilities and a risk/vulnerability/threat assessment on paper so a plan could be devised as to priorities before any event occurred. In this way resources could be allocated, and training developed to prepare for the possibilities. The plan would have to be flexible to be capable be working in an unexpected event (all hazard).

Some specific training requirement needed.

a. All agencies would need to be familiar with the NIMS with a ICS chart with each division (operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration) assigned to a qualified person and a backup for that person.

b. EOC developed with dedicated space with pre assigned personnel that would staff in an event of an emergency along with deciated equipment in place prior to the event (s)

c. The EOC should contain representatives from Fire, Police, EMS, hospitals, utility department, transportation, local officials, and volunteer organizations.

d. A redundant communication system tying all departments together on dedicated frequencies. I would require that the system be checked on a weekly basis with all departments included.

e. MOUs in place with neighboring communities and agreements with state, and federal departments if assistance is required.

f. I would want all hospital in the area to be trained in (HERT) Hospital Emergency Response Team course put on by FEMA

g. I would want the hospitals to have addressed the surge capacity requirements and made arrangements to comply.

h. I would have the police and fire department to pick designated personnel and have them attend the DHS courses at NMT, Nevada Test site, and FT. McClellan, Ala. so they could return and train the other personnel. I think this is very important to have the front line responders know what they are dealing with at the scene since a WMD event is not the typical crime scene they are familiar with and reorganization of ordinance is extremely important and in talking to policemen and firemen they have not had any training or if any training maybe one course and they will be the first as the scene.

i. According to Cole’s book “Terror” , every time a ER changes shikts in Israel they at least discuss their emergency plan of attack if they get a MCI on their shift.---that to me is training.

j. I would have table top, functional, and full scale exercises to improve cooperation with all department and the EOC at least two times per year.

k. There should be some type of incentive for the personnel to participate in the online course offered by FEMA (ISC) related to emergency events.

l. A continuing education program for IRIB, PRSBI, and MRTCBNE for the EMS, police and fire departments.

What considerations should be addressed when dealing with the threat of responder targets?

I think all first responders, in training, should have it drilled into their heads to take care of number one (themselves) first and have them understand the why of this rule. Too many young EMS personnel, with good intentions, go into this field to save lives and it is hard not to rush to the aid of an injured person and disregard their own selves, then they become a victim and add to the problem.

The three main guidelines for EMTs are life safety, property and environment, and scene stability.

I think the essential guidelines of the U.S. Fire Administration says it all;

1. Anticipate the presence of secondary devices at any suspicious event.

2. Search for a secondary device before moving into the incident area. This should be done by qualified personnel like EOD or hazmat and certainly not by the EMTs. In many incidents, the EMT can “eye ball” the area and get a feel if he can get a victim out quickly without injury to himself and not trigger a secondary device. This type decision can only be made at the time and no hard and fast rule can be made.

3. Avoid touching or moving anything at the site until cleared by the hazmat team or bomb squad. One should consider that an unconscious or dead victim could be triggered to a secondary device or even have a secondary device under them and activate the device with moving the victim. The adversary do not play by our rules.

4. Effectively manage the scene with boundaries, zones, triage area, etc. In fact in the suicide bomb course at NMT they establish the hot zone line at the site of the most distant fragment from the explosion. This line demarcates the hot or from the warm zone and there are relatively safe ways for an EMT to penetrate this zone and recovery victims with some training in this type scenario.

5. Evaluate victims and non essential personnel as quickly as possible.

6. Preserve the scene as much as possible for evidence since this is a crime scene.

If the event is cause by a LEE (low energy explosion) there will be incomplete explosive fragments that are hot and probably there are other explosive elements in the hot zone that are still active.

Again realistic training is the answer to getting the EMTs ready to handle a WMD and stay alive to work again.

References:

1. www. osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness

2. Prevention and Response to Suicide bombing Incidents Aug.28- Sept.1,2006 DHS, New Mexico Tech.

3. Incident response to Terrorist Bombings April 18-21, 2006 DHS New Mexico Tech.

4. Cole, Leonard Terror: How Israel Has Coped and What America Can Learn Indiana University Press 2007

Surveillance: For Good -- and for Evil

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Editor's Note: This is the first in a series of articles addressing surveillance and countersurveillance.
Whether terrorists are attempting to assassinate a high-ranking government official, bring down a building or explode a bomb in a subway, their first order of business is to determine how best to set up the attack. To make such a determination, pre-operational surveillance of the target is vital.
If the target is a person, surveillance will determine his or her patterns of behavior; for a building, subway or other facility, the surveillance would help define possible weaknesses. In this way, attackers can determine the best time, location and method for the attack; how best to take advantage of the element of surprise - and how to escape afterward.

Terrorists, of course, are not alone in this regard. Carrying out an attack of any kind - a bank robbery, purse snatching or kidnapping, for example - requires that the perpetrators eye their target in advance, although the extent of the surveillance and its complexity will vary depending on the scale of the operation and the end goal. A purse snatcher, for example, might size up the victim for only a few seconds, while terrorists could assign a special team for this specific mission and then take up to several weeks to get the job done. Kidnappers and assassins also conduct surveillance of varying lengths to understand the target's daily routine, including the time he leaves the house in the morning and the route he takes to work.

U.S. and Jordanian intelligence indicates that the cell involved in the Nov. 9 suicide bombings in Amman, Jordan, conducted surveillance on all three hotels involved, though details about the length and degree of surveillance remain murky. The perpetrators of the April 1992 kidnapping of Exxon executive Sidney Reso conducted extensive surveillance and found that Reso was most vulnerable when he reached the end of his driveway on the way to work in the morning. Reso died while in captivity.

Stalkers or mentally disturbed individuals who fixate on someone surveil their victims in advance, although in many cases the stalker wants to get caught and thus does not need to be looking for possible escape routes. Also, a stalker usually strikes impulsively with little consideration given to the consequences. Stalkers or lone wolf attackers generally will conduct surveillance alone, making them difficult, but not impossible, to spot.

A great deal of surveillance also is conducted for purposes of collecting information. U.S. government employees and American businesspeople and business facilities overseas are routinely subjected to surveillance by local intelligence agencies in places such as China, France and Israel. The goal here is economic espionage aimed at keeping abreast of business activities - and stealing business secrets. Industrial spies, though working for themselves or for private concerns, have similar goals. Private investigators routinely observe people and places for their clients, usually to link an individual to a particular activity or event.

Not all surveillance is conducted for nefarious purposes, however. On the contrary, surveillance is an integral part of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence operations designed to prevent criminal and terrorist activity. Security personnel place closed circuit TV in retail stores and banks to deter criminals, while police officers stake out certain street corners to keep tabs on drug-traffickers, for instance.
Surveillance is a fact of life in the 21st century. In many ways, technological advances have made it easier for law enforcement to protect citizens. These advances, however, also have made it easier for those who wish to do harm.
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The Spread of Technological Surveillance
Editor's Note: This is the second in a series of analyses on surveillance and countersurveillance.

As far back as the 5th century B.C., Chinese warrior-philosopher Sun Tzu went on record citing the paramount importance of using spies and clandestine reconnaissance to uncover enemy plans. At the time - and for centuries afterward - surveillance involved placing an operative close enough to a target to track his movements or overhear his conversations. Technological advances - especially those that have come along over the past century - have made it possible not only to watch and listen to others from afar, but to do so with ease.

Today, technical surveillance is conducted for a wide variety of purposes by individuals as diverse as terrorists, private investigators, activists, paparazzi, peeping toms, law enforcement and governments - and even by parents who listen in on their infants via baby monitors. These people are tracking a subject's activities, usually from a distance or remotely, using devices specifically designed or adapted for that purpose such as global positioning system (GPS) locaters, sophisticated listening devices and cameras of all kinds.

Al Qaeda used technical surveillance when targeting financial institutions in Washington, D.C., New York and Newark, N.J., and potential targets in Singapore in 2003. In New York, for example, several operatives sat in a Starbucks café across the street from their intended target and recorded various aspects of the institution's security measures and building access. Their notes and some of their videos were found on a laptop computer after authorities broke up the cell. Although al Qaeda's uses less-sophisticated technology than some - hand-held cameras versus micro-cameras and bionic ears, for example - the network's ability to conduct technical surveillance still is formidable.

Environmental activists, animal rights activists, anarchists and anti-globalization activists frequently surveil their subjects before staging a protest or "direct action" operations. Groups that target corporations for sabotage, such as the Earth Liberation Front, are especially sophisticated in the use of technical surveillance.

The Ruckus Society is a group devoted to training activists in "electronic scouting" - technical surveillance involving the use of remote cameras, GPS locators, frequency counters, programmable scanners and night-vision goggles. Program graduates, then, utilize high-tech equipment such as miniature remote cameras and "bionic ear" listening devices to conduct their surveillance. These activists frequently use programmable scanners and cameras to monitor security/police communications and activity in order to warn the saboteurs of an impeding response by law enforcement.

In some countries, it is not uncommon for Western business or government travelers to find telltale signs of listening devices in their hotel rooms, offices, meeting rooms and chauffeur-driven cars. In other instances, people have been caught spying on others in public bathrooms and changing rooms using tiny cameras that can be concealed in something as seemingly innocuous as an air freshener or electrical outlet.

The accessibility and miniature size of today's surveillance equipment makes it easy for just about anyone to clandestinely watch another. As technology continues to advance and surveillance becomes even more ubiquitous, methods to thwart such eavesdropping also will improve.
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Physical Surveillance: Tailing Someone on the Move
Editor's Note: This is third in a series of analyses on surveillance and countersurveillance.

The image of the darkly clad private eye slipping in and out of doorways as he surreptitiously tails his subject around the busy city is straight out of the movies. The fact is, however, that physical surveillance often is carried out this way - using a lot of shoe leather. Technological advances and expert training in stealth have made the job easier than in the past, but when it comes down to it, there is no other way to keep an eye on a subject who is on the move.
Technical surveillance is carried out remotely, usually through video or audio recording equipment, and the subject remains in one place, such as a hotel room, home or office. Physical surveillance, on the other hand, is performed by human operatives, and often involves observing the subject's actions as he travels around outside the home or office.

In fact, private investigators lack the enormous human and technical resources needed to get the job done right. This type of surveillance requires a large number of highly trained operatives who must be constantly trained as improvements in techniques are implemented. This requires a significant support structure of instructors, facilities, money and material, as well as a well-developed network of communications to link the operatives together.
Physical surveillance can be broken down into two categories: static and mobile. Static surveillance favors the home team, and puts a visitor or newcomer to the scene of the surveillance at a disadvantage. If the operatives conducting the surveillance are familiar with the area, they can better blend in with the local scenery, and thus be harder to detect. They also can better anticipate their subject's moves. The Soviets used static surveillance against U.S. Embassy personnel in Moscow during the Cold War. On the other hand, if the subject is local and the operatives are from outside the area, the advantage goes to the subject, who would be in a better position to spot people in his environment who do not fit in - especially in small settings.

However, static surveillance - when carried out properly - is difficult to detect because good surveillance operatives blend in with their surroundings and make themselves as innocuous as possible. As creatures of habit, most people get used to their surroundings, and fail to notice things they see every day. By blending in with the scenery the subject sees every day, such as the local neighborhood or route taken every morning to work, the operative can effectively become invisible. Because of this, static surveillance requires a high degree of situational awareness - and a certain amount of paranoia - to detect.
Although static surveillance is the hardest type to detect and counter, it is expensive - as it can involve renting apartments, stores, street vendor kiosks and carts and other similar observation posts, known as "perches" in surveillance jargon. Because the operatives do not move, static surveillance requires that operatives be perched at close intervals so that they can keep a constant eye on the target. In general, only governments have the manpower and resources necessary to do this type of surveillance properly.

Mobile surveillance can be carried out in two ways: in vehicles or on foot. A wider area can be covered in vehicular surveillance - and is vital if the subject is traveling by car - although this type of surveillance does have limitations. Should the subject go into an office building, a subway or a shopping mall, for example, the operatives in the vehicle cannot follow. Because of this limitation, vehicular surveillance is usually carried out in conjunction with foot surveillance. The operatives on foot are in communication with the operatives in the vehicle. In addition, the operatives in the vehicle will often drop off one of their team to continue following the target. Mixed car/foot operations are effective because the target more often will focus on other pedestrians rather than the cars around him.

Depending on the resources available or allocated for a specific operation, mobile surveillance can range from an operative following the subject on foot - the hardest type of surveillance to accomplish without being detected - to an elaborate operation that puts the subject in a "bubble." The highest level involves multiple mobile and static surveillance teams all linked by communications and coordinating with one another to ensure that the subject's every movement is monitored - and that the team is not detected.

The bubble also provides protection against any erratic move the target might utilize to determine if he is being watched, or to ditch the surveillance. Therefore, if the team senses that the target has begun to "stairstep" (a series of deliberate turns intended to expose a surveillance team) through a residential neighborhood with very little activity on the street, the team using the bubble can wait outside the area instead of following the target through the maneuvers. Teams using a bubble will also frequently change "the eye" (the person directly watching the target) so that the target does not see the same face or vehicle twice. Again, in almost all cases, only a government has the resources and training to effectively provide this highest level of surveillance coverage.

In order to conduct surveillance uninterrupted over a long period of time, a combination of static and vehicular surveillance is often employed. Static surveillance operatives will stake out the subject's location - perhaps renting an apartment across the street from the person's home, and then give a "call out" to the mobile surveillance team when the subject moves. The static operative will advise the mobile team what direction the subject is going and if the subject is on foot or in a vehicle.

Physical surveillance - especially on a surveillance-aware target - is extremely difficult to carry out effectively, as it requires a great deal of training and practical experience. Criminals and terrorists who attempt to pull off an effective tail often lack the street skills to be effective, and often make mistakes that tip off the target. Because their objective can be to ambush - to kill or kidnap the subject - spotting physical surveillance is of critical importance.
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Physical Surveillance: The Art of Blending In
Editor's Note: This is the fourth in a series of analyses on surveillance and countersurveillance.

Role playing is an important aspect of undercover surveillance work - and those who attempt it without sufficient training often make mistakes that can alert their subject to the fact that they are being watched, or raise the suspicions of law enforcement or countersurveillance teams.

Among the most common mistakes made by amateurs when conducting physical surveillance is the failure to get into proper character for the job or, when in character, to appear in places or carry out activities that are incongruent with the "costume." The terms used to describe these role-playing aspects of surveillance are "cover for status" and "cover for action." Good cover for status is an operative playing the role of a student studying in a coffee shop; bad cover for status is an operative dressed in business clothes walking in the woods. Good cover for action is an operative dressed as a telephone repairman pretending to work on phone lines - not playing chess in the park.

The purpose of using good cover for action and cover for status is to make the operative's presence look routine and normal. When done right, the operative fits in with the mental snapshot subconsciously taken by the subject as he goes about his business. Inexperienced surveillance operative, or those without adequate resources, can be easily detected and their cover blown.

An acronym used by government agencies when training operatives in effective surveillance is TEDD: Time, Environment, Distance and Demeanor. Failure to take into account these four elements is another amateurish mistake that can get the operative caught. The factors of time, environment and distance are important because a subject who notices the same person hovering around again and again at different times and locations is more likely to become aware that he is being watched. Demeanor refers to lack of cover or simply bad body language - which also can alert a subject to the presence of a surveillance team.
A surveillance operative also must be extensively trained to avoid the so-called "burn syndrome," the erroneous belief that the subject has spotted him. Feeling burned will cause the operative to do unnatural things, such as suddenly ducking back into a doorway or turning around abruptly when he unexpectedly comes face to face with his target. People inexperienced in the art of surveillance find it difficult to control this natural reaction.

These are just a few of the enormous number of mistakes that amateurs can make while conducting physical surveillance. They also can tip off the subject as to their presence by simply lurking around an area with no reason to be there, by entering or leaving a building immediately after the subject, or simply by running in street clothes.

Surveillance operatives following the subject in a vehicle also can make many mistakes, including:

Parking in the same spot for an extended period of time while sitting in the front seat.
Starting and stopping as the target moves.
Driving too slowly or too fast and making erratic moves or abrupt stops.
Signaling a turn but not making it.
Following a target through a red light.
Using two-way radios, binoculars or cameras from a vehicle.
Flashing headlights between vehicles.
Maintaining the same distance from the target even at varying speeds.
Pausing in traffic circles until the target vehicle has taken an exit.
vehicles that close on the target in heavy traffic but fall back in light traffic
Jumping from the vehicle when the subject stops his vehicle and gets out.
Parking a vehicle but remaining in the car.
Tipping off the subject as to a shift change by having one vehicle pull up and park while the other pulls away - especially in an area the subject knows well, such as near the home or office.
In general, because of the resources and extensive training required to avoid making these mistakes, only governments have the time and resources to make surveillance operations highly effective. Even then, some very basic mistakes can be made that can alert the subject to the presence of a surveillance operation.

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Turning the Tables on Surveillants
Editor's Note: This is the fifth in a series of analyses on surveillance and countersurveillance.

Victims of planned hostile actions - such as kidnappings or killings - almost always are closely monitored by their attackers in advance of the operation. Such pre-operational surveillance enables the plotters to determine the best method of attack, as well as the best time and place to carry it out. Savvy countersurveillance, however, can go a long way toward thwarting a hostile act.

The cardinal rule for personal safety is for people to be aware of their surroundings at all times and to observe the behavior of others in the area. However, detecting surveillance - especially when it is performed well - often requires that one take extra precautions. One of the best ways for a person to determine whether he or she is being tailed is to use a surveillance detection route (SDR). By altering their behavior, those under surveillance can manipulate the situation, causing members of the surveillance team to act in ways that betray their presence and intentions. In fact, understanding that a potential victim can manipulate a surveillance situation is one of the most important lessons to be gleaned from this series.

Although hiring professional surveillance detection and countersurveillance teams - or drivers trained to provide more than a smooth ride - are obvious choices, not everyone who is at risk has the resources to do so. Individuals, however, can take a number of steps to determine whether they are under hostile surveillance. Techniques for manipulating surveillance teams include stair-stepping, varying routes and departure times, using intrusion points, and timing stops.

The most common and effective SDR tool is the channel - a long, straight corridor that has several exits or routes at the far end. A person who wants to ensure he is not being tailed can use the channel to force the surveillant to follow closely behind. This is because the operative cannot parallel the subject's route and cannot know which way the subject will go at the end of the channel. Natural channels are long narrow bridges and sections of highway that have no exits or overpasses, but that branch out in a number of routes on the far side. The subway is also a type of channel. Most people likely use such channels in their daily routes but are unaware of them.

Stair-stepping involves making turns - in a vehicle or on foot - that deviate slightly from the most direct route to the destination. During a stair-stepping sequence, a surveillant is likely to reveal his presence by staying with his subject during the series of turns - a common mistake among amateur surveillance operatives who fear losing sight of the target. The subject, however, should not make sudden, unnatural movements, or the surveillance team will break off without revealing its presence.

By varying routes and departure times, the subject can cause surveillants to go into action abruptly in order to compensate for the change in plans. Unless it has a wide area covered, the team could be forced to break off surveillance or act more overtly to prevent losing its target. Varying departure times from fixed locations such as the home or office also can be quite effective because it can force the surveillants to remain in one place longer than anticipated - and thus attract attention.

An intrusion point is a place along a person's route, preferably with a secondary exit such as a back door, where a surveillance target can stop and see whether anyone is following. If the intrusion point has a secondary exit, the subject can give the surveillance team the slip by heading out the back door. If the surveillance team knows the place, however, it could very well have another surveillant waiting by the secondary exit. This kind of coverage generally requires the kind of resources that only a government can lavish on a surveillance operation. Intrusion points - like all parts of the SDR - cannot be random. They should be planned in advance and worked into a daily routine.

Finally, conducting timing stops is one more way to spot hostile surveillance. A timing stop is a place where a person stops and looks back before reaching the final destination to ensure he is not being tailed. It doesn't have to be long - especially in a vehicle.

Physical threats to individuals from terrorists, assassins, kidnappers or even stalkers are site-dependant. The assailants choose the location and timing of their attack based on criteria that gives them the best chance of successfully carrying out the attack and - unless the attacker is mentally disturbed or on a suicide mission - of escaping. These criteria include restricting or controlling the target's ability to maneuver or escape, and providing optimal cover for any surveillance or attack team.

Another way to safeguard against potential hazards is by conducting an analysis of one's normal route to identify points of vulnerability such as overpasses, bridges and tunnels, to minimize hazards and deny potential attackers any advantage. Route analysis can also identify potential attack sites - points along the route that restrict the target's movement, and provide cover and an escape route for the attackers. Once a potential attack site is identified, possible vantage points - or perches - for hostile surveillance or attack teams should be watched.

High-profile individuals or anyone who resides in a high-crime or -terrorism area such as Mexico City or Baghdad should take the initiative and identify surveillants before they have the opportunity to strike. Once hostile surveillance has been identified, immediate action should be taken and assistance called in.
© Copyright 2008 Strategic Forecasting Inc.
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Draft National Response Framework Released for Public Comment

Draft National Response Framework Released for Public Comment
Release Date: September 10, 2007
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released today the draft National Response Framework (NRF), successor to the National Response Plan, for a 30-day public comment period. The Framework, which focuses on response and short-term recovery, articulates the doctrine, principles and architecture by which our nation prepares for and responds to all-hazard disasters across all levels of government and all sectors of communities. The Framework is responsive to repeated federal, state and local requests for a streamlined document that is shorter, less bureaucratic and more user-friendly.

The Framework is intended for senior elected and appointed leaders, such as federal agency heads, state governors, mayors, tribal leaders and city managers. Simultaneously, it informs emergency management practitioners by explaining the operating structures and tools routinely used by first responders and emergency managers at all levels of government.

“The Framework recognizes that most incidents are managed locally,” said Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. “But when needed to support state and local officials as they respond to a disaster, the Framework establishes the playbook for the federal coordination of resources and assets to manage disasters of all sizes and scope.”

The Framework incorporates a number of key recommendations from more than 700 individuals representing federal, tribal, state and local governments, non-governmental agencies and associations, and the private sector, who participated in a review process that began in September 2006. In addition to the core Framework, supporting documents, including Emergency Support Functions, Support and Incident Annexes and other appendices have also been updated, expanded and remain an integral part of the Framework. These documents are available at the newly-created NRF Resource Center, which is available online at www.fema.gov/nrf. This resource center will be continuously updated as additional supporting materials are created or revised.
The 30-day comment period provides interested parties with the opportunity to provide feedback on the document. A comment form has been circulated to various departments, agencies and key stakeholders.

Individuals who wish to submit comments can obtain a comment form and instructions for submission online at www.fema.gov/nrf.
In addition to the core Framework, supporting documents, including Emergency Support Functions, Support and Incident Annexes and other appendices have also been updated and remain an integral part of the Framework. There will be a 60-day comment period for these supplemental documents. During this period, the existing National Response Plan remains in effect.*
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